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The effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance: empirical
evidence from Bangladesh
Abstract
Purpose: This study examines the influence of corporate social disclosure on firm performance within the
context of Bangladesh.
Design/methodology/approach: This study develops hypotheses with the light of legitimacy and
signalling theory using top 200 firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh. Corporate social
disclosure (CSD) data are based on the period from 2011 to 2013, and the firm performance (FP) is based
on the respective following year 2012 to 2014. A corporate social disclosure index (CSDI) including three
categories (long-term, short- term and general disclosure) is constructed to measure the extent of social
disclosures in annual reports. Firm performance is measured based on three indicators including Return
on Asset (ROA), Market Capitalization, and Tobin Q. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least
Square (2SLS) are used in analysing the data.
Findings: It is found that there is a significant relationship between corporate social disclosure and the
following year's firm performance for every performance indicator. It is also found that long-term
disclosure plays a key role in influencing the firm performance.
Originality/ value: CSD is country-specific and, hence, the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm
performance can vary from country to country. This study enhances understating of such relationship as
it considers within the context of a developing country. The finding of this study is robust as every
indicator of firm performance is found to be related positively to firm performance.
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The Effects of Corporate Social Disclosure on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from
Bangladesh.

1. Introduction
There is a growing interest in regards to corporate social disclosure of firm’s activities to
be disclosed in its annual report within the developed as well as the developing countries. It is
argued that from a firm’s perspective, any corporate disclosure may be incorporated in an annual
report in two different forms: mandatory or voluntary. In general, most of the firm’s activities of
the financial nature are regulated by the enforced corporate acts or relevant accounting standards
adopted by the respective country in which the firm is in operation. However, in respect to
disclosure that is not regulated by law is called voluntary disclosure. Corporate social disclosure
(CSD) is mostly considered voluntary disclosure that emphasises the consideration of moral
obligation and accountability towards the society. Since corporate social disclosure has an
influence on firm performance, therefore, academics, policymakers, governing bodies and
investors, to name a few, from both the developed and developing countries perspective have
become increasingly interested to enhance understanding of the relationship between corporate
social disclosure and firm performance. However, the relationship from prior studies found to be
inconclusive (Griffin and Mahon, 1997, Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003).
As the literature is yet considered to be inconclusive and there are some factors which
have been considered as constraints for such conclusiveness; and, therefore, there is a necessity
to address those further. First, there is a view that statistical analyses to examine the relationship
between disclosure and firm performance are not without limitations (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004,
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Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Second, as to the relationship between CSD and firm performance the
selection of appropriate indicators of firm performance is challenging (Griffin and Mahon, 1997,
Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003). Third, categories of firm performance measurements (i.e.,
accounting based, market- based and mixed) are also subject to limitations (Richard et al., 2009).
There is a view that corporate social issues in developed countries are monitored by
strong regulated monitoring bodies as well as the interested parties in the society. In contrast, in
developing countries such issues might not be monitored effectively for many reasons including
poverty, corruption, social inequalities and mismanagement, small capital market, and weak
regulations. As such, CSD is mainly considered to be an occidental concept of western countries
due to strong corporate regulations and standards compare to developing countries (Chapple and
Moon, 2005). Some of the extant CSD studies from developing country context were also seen to
be consistent with such perceptions with exceptions (Belal, 1999, Belal, 2001, Chapple and
Moon, 2005, Ratanajongkol et al., 2006, Sobhani et al., 2009). Such findings lead to further
examine as to whether firms from developing country contexts use CSD as effective mediums of
communication with various stakeholders which ultimately effects firm performance (Aras et al.,
2010). That is, to reiterate, it is apparent that the effects of CSD on firm performance within
developing countries are not documented in an extensive manner compare to those carried out
using developed country contexts.
Since CSD varies in annual reports from country to country (Boesso and Kumar, 2007,
Burton et al., 2000) as there are no unified voluntary disclosure practices to be applied; therefore,
the same occidental concept of CSD may not be applicable for developing country concept due
to different cultural models and traditional customs (Burton et al., 2000, Disu and Gray, 1998,
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Edmondson and Carroll, 1999). Thus far, the limited studies that exist using developing country
contexts (Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003) includes China, Malaysia, and Singapore (Ahmad
et al., 2003, Eng and Mak, 2003, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Huafang
and Jianguo, 2007).
The objective of this study is two folded. First, it is to investigate the effects of CSD on
firm performance by addressing the constraints of prior studies. Second, this study is to examine
the effects of CSD on firm performance within the context of a developing country.
Bangladeshi context is considered for this study. Such a consideration is motivated for the
following reasons. First, there exist a limited number of studies that have examined the effects of
CSD to firm performance (FP) in Bangladesh. In addition, CSD research in Bangladesh are
mainly limited to explore the extent of corporate social issues in annual reports (Azim et al.,
2009, Belal, 1999, Belal, 2001, Belal, 2008, Belal and Momin, 2009, Kamal and Deegan, 2013,
Sobhani et al., 2009) and determinants of CSD (Khan et al., 2013, Muttakin and Khan, 2014,
Rashid and Lodh, 2008); rather than examining the relationship between CSD and FP. As such,
the effects of CSD on firm performance are not well documented yet in Bangladeshi context.
Second, Bangladesh economy is progressing with an inspiring track record with the growth of
nearly six percent per year sustained over the past decade. A recent report from World Bank1 and
PWC2 also forecasts that Bangladesh will be one of the emerging economies within a few
decades. Accordingly, Bangladesh government is also keen to improve social condition at both

1

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/04/30/bangladesh-development-update-bangladesheconomy-requires-focus-on-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth-moving-forward
2
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf
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micro and macro level3. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that firms from Bangladesh may
consider social disclosure to legitimise firm activities as a part of social and global concerns.
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) of Bangladesh was also reformed in 2011 to ensure more
transparency and disclosure from the listed firms. Moreover, a firm within developing countries
like Bangladesh highly relies on foreign aid and investments.
Thus, the remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section documents
CSD and FP with the lens of legitimacy and signalling theories. A review of the literature on the
effects CSD on FP is addressed afterward. This is followed by an elaboration on the linkage
between CSD and FP within Bangladeshi context. This is followed by the development of
hypotheses for this study. Next, the details of the research method used in the study are
addressed. The results of this study are then shown in the following part. In the final section, the
implications, limitations and the further scope are elaborated.

2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical Frameworks
There exist several theoretical stances that have been adopted by prior studies in
examining the relationship between corporate social disclosures and firm performance within
developed as well as developing country contexts. Among the theories, legitimacy theory is one
of the widely considered theory within voluntary disclosure context. The legitimacy theory is
based on the view of a social contract that exists between the firm and society. Suchman (1995)

3

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/13/bangladesh-development-update-slower-yet-healthy-growth-withremarkable-development-progress
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outlines legitimacy concept as ‘‘generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions’’ (p 574). In addition, according to Guthrie and Parker (1989) &
O’Donovan (2002), legitimacy theory is based on the concept that a firm should operate by
satisfying the expectation of the society. Furthermore, legitimacy theory explains how firms may
intend to legitimise their operational activities by engaging additional information through
voluntary disclosure (An et al., 2011, Deegan et al., 1996, Deegan and Gordon, 1996). For
legitimising firm’s operational activities, firm provide additional information through voluntary
disclosure like social disclosure. A firm also considers such disclosure to substantiate firm’s
accountability towards the society as an element of a social contract as well as to receive a
positive impression from various interested parties within the society. As a result, using
voluntary disclosure perspective, a wide number of studies have explored such relationships
using legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2002, Guthrie et al., 2006, Khan et al., 2013, Khan, 2010,
Muttakin and Khan, 2014, O’Donovan, 2002).
There is a view that some significant features of legitimacy theory can explain corporate
social disclosure aspects more effectively. First, according to legitimacy theory, legitimising firm
activities means establishing that firm activities (operational) comply with the social values of
the society in which it operates, and also those activities must be acknowledged through firm’s
disclosure (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). As a result, a firm may motivate to focus on voluntary
disclosures (Deegan, 2002). Therefore, it is argued that firm’s legitimising efforts and voluntary
disclosure may have a close interaction. Second, from corporate social disclosure perspective,
legitimising firm’s activities are much significant for firm’s image and value through which
firms try to communicate with the interested parties (Deegan, 2002, Deegan et al., 2002, Guthrie
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et al., 2006, O’Donovan, 2002). Finally, through corporate social disclosure a firm may want to
convey firm’s strategic value and the potential value-creating capacities. Moreover, legitimacy
theory can be used to explore the current status of voluntary disclosure as well.
Signalling theory, on the other hand, posits the concept of disclosure from a different
viewpoint. It views disclosure in annual reports can provide a signal and, therefore, facilitates
effective commutation with the interested parties. Signalling theory originally constructed by
(Spence, 1973) to explain the behaviour of labour market. (Morris, 1987) advocates, the concept
of signalling theory is more applicable in accounting studies to explore information asymmetry.
An et al. (2011) note that firm may reduce information asymmetry by considering extra
information (mostly positive information) as a signal. Thus, signalling may have an impact on
interested parties’ perceptions towards the firm performance (Whiting and Miller, 2008). It is
also argued that the concept of signalling is associated with voluntary disclosure (Watson et al.,
2002, Whiting and Miller, 2008, Xiao et al., 2004). According to signalling theory, firms can
differentiate their activities by sending signals to the interested parties for developing a positive
image. Whiting and Miller (2008) argue that consideration of such a signal a firm may help
encouraging interested parties to reassess the value of the firm(Botosan, 1997, Botosan and
Plumlee, 2002, Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Sengupta, 1998). As such, firms may also create a positive
image and reduce information asymmetry by considering corporate social disclosure as a signal
of firm’s social commitment (Anderson and Frankle, 1980, Shane and Spicer, 1983).
Based on the above discussions, this study considers using legitimacy and
signalling theories. The considered theoretical perspectives of this study are presented in Figure
1.
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Legitimacy Theory
legitimizing firm activities as a
social contract/ accountability
Interested Parties
(Investors, policy
makers and so on)
Signalling theory
Reducing information
asymmetry by sending signal
Figure1: Theoritical perspective for this study.
2.2 Literature on the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance
There exits plethora of studies conducted on the effects of corporate social disclosure on
firm performance using developed country context. Several meta-analyses show that a significant
number of prior studies have reported mixed findings (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010, Mathews,
1997, Orlitzky et al., 2003). De Klerk et al. (2015) report that CSD has a positive effect on the
share price of a firm. They have examined 89 largest firms in the UK for the year 2007-08.
Within the research model, their study considers firm size and leverage as a control variable for
the firm performance. They argue that having more CSD reduces the information asymmetry. As
a result, the investors might assess the risk of the firm more efficiently and lead to a better firm
performance (share price). Qiu et al. (2016) suggest a positive relationship regarding the effects
of CSD on firm performance (market-based measure) after examining 152 firms from FTSE 350
for the year 2005to 2009. They argue that having CSD in annual reports can act as firm’s
competitive advantage which can lead to a better firm performance.
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Within the context of developing/emerging countries, Choi et al. (2010) examine Korean
firms by considering 1222 firm-years using data from 2002 to 2008. Their study has considered
disclosure index using both weighted and un-weighted indices and several firm performance
indicators including ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Their findings show that the weighted CSD
index effects FP, but un-weighted index of CSD is not. Platonova et al. (2016) found that CSD
has an influence on firm performance. Their study considers 24 Islamic banks in Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC - 9 from Bahrain, 3 from Qatar, 3 from Kuwait, 4 from Saudi Arabia
and 5 from UAE) over the period 2000 to 2014. They rely on accounting based measurements
(ROA and ROE) and have found a positive relationship. They have further investigated on the
relationship between CSD categories and firm performance as well, but they could not find any
significant association among the considered categories.

2.3 Literature on the relationship between CSD and firm performance within Bangladesh
It is from late ‘90s, researches on corporate social issues have been considered by several
researchers in Bangladesh. Belal (1999) is the pioneer of social reporting studies in Bangladeshi
context. In Bangladesh, prior studies regarding CSD are mostly emphasised to assess the extent
of disclosure rather than examining the relationship between the CSD and FP (Azim et al., 2009,
Belal, 2008, Belal and Momin, 2009, Khan et al., 2009, Sobhani et al., 2009).
Although there is an increasing trend of corporate social disclosure by Bangladeshi
firms, but, to reiterate, the effects of CSD on firm performance has not yet been well researched.
For example, Hossain et al. (2015) report that CSD has a positive impact on firm performance for
Bangladeshi firms. They have considered 131 listed firms in Bangladesh by excluding Treasury
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Bond and Mutual Funds for the period of 2008 to 2012. In light of legitimacy theory, their study
suggests that CSD influences positively on return on asset and return on equity, but fails to find
such effects using Tobin Q.

2.4 Hypotheses Development
It is apparent in the prior studies from both developed and developing country contexts
that there is mixed evidence (positive, negative and neutral) as to the effects of corporate social
disclosure on firm performance. Therefore, consistent with the considered theories, the following
hypotheses are developed to examine the effects of CSD on FP for Bangladeshi contexts:
H1: Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Firm Performance.
H1(a): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Return on Asset
H1(b): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Market Capitalization
H1(c): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Tobin Q

3 Empirical tests
3.1 Sample Selection
For collecting corporate social disclosure data annual reports of the firms have been
considered as a source. There are some significant reasons to consider annual reports as a source
of data. First, an annual report is considered as a source for most of the information of a firm
(Botosan, 1997) because significant issues and concerns of a firm are expressed comprehensively
through the annual report (Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005, Khan et al., 2009). Second, annual
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report is easily accessible source of information (Unerman, 2000) that can be obtained in both
hard copies as well as electronically. Therefore, for exploring CSD from a reliable source, this
study considers annual reports as source of data.. However, for gathering firm performance,
Bloomberg Database has been considered instead that of relying on annual reports. It should be
noted that some financial performance information such as market capitalization data of a firm is
not available from the annual reports. Therefore, there is a necessity to collect all the market data
from one authentic platform; this study thus relies on Bloomberg database.
Top 200 firms (based on market capitalization) listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange
(DSE) are considered as the sample for this study. Having a higher marker capitalization is
deemed to have extra resources compare to other firms (Adams et al., 1998, Andrew et al., 1989)
and expected to be more proactive for social disclosure perspectives. Within the top 200 firms,
there are some sectors including the Bond, Insurance, and Mutual Funds have extremely different
reporting structure for firm performance data; therefore, Bond, Insurance and Mutual Funds
sectors are not considered for this study. After excluding these sectors, a final 134 firms (68% of
total market equity and 45.0% of total sample) have been considered.
It should be noted that Bangladesh share market confronted by a severe stock market
collapse due to price bubble in 2010 (Barua et al., 2014) and gradually turn as normal in 2011.
As a result, the consideration of data from 2011 may help to avoid the distortion from the share
market collapse. Therefore, in regards to corporate social disclosure data, this study considers
from the year 2011 and onwards. In addition, the data of FP variables are collected from annual
reports for the financial year 2012 to 2014 to apply one year lag. The lag concept is being
implemented with the argument that the effects of CSD are observable in next available financial
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period and this approach is consistent with the prior studies (Harjoto and Jo, 2015, Mahoney and
Thorne, 2005, Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore, this study collects data from 2011 to
2013 for corporate social disclosure and 2012 to 2014 for firm performance data. 134 firms for
three years resulted in a final sample of 402 firm-year observations. Table 1 is presented below
to show the sector wise sampling information.
Table 1: Sector-wise sample details
Sector

Total
Firms within
Firms included as
Observed Firm
Firms
Top 200
sample
Years
Bank
30
30
30
90
Cement
7
7
6
18
Ceramic
5
3
3
9
Engineering
26
18
12
36
Food & Allied
17
9
8
24
Fuel & Power
15
13
12
36
IT
6
2
1
3
Miscellaneous
9
6
4
12
NBFI
23
22
19
57
Pharmaceutical
24
19
16
48
Service & Real Estate
3
3
3
9
Tannery
5
3
3
9
Telecommunication
2
2
2
6
Textile
31
18
13
39
Travel & Leisure
3
2
2
2
Bond
3
2
0
0
Insurance
46
31
0
0
Mutual Fund
41
10
0
0
Paper & Printing
1
0
0
0
Jute
3
0
0
0
Total
300
200*
134**
402
* Top 200 covers 77% of Total Market Equity & 67% of Total Sample Size
** Selected sample covers 68% of Total Market Equity & 45% of Total Sample Size

3.2 Corporate Social Disclosure Index- Independent Variable
Corporate Social Disclosure Index is considered as a proxy on the extent of CSD. It is
measured in terms of various social features reported in the firm’s annual report. Consistent with
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earlier studies (Hackston and Milne, 1996, Haniffa and Cooke, 2005, Kamal and Deegan, 2013)
a checklist of 30 items has been selected to assess the extent of CSD within the annual reports.
Selected 30 items of corporate social disclosure are sub-categorised based on various
social contexts. Categorising disclosure is an important factor. (Meek et al., 1995).

30 items

are categorised into a wide range of categories including governance, strategy, employee,
customer, donation and generic concept of the social disclosure are captured (Hackston and
Milne, 1996, Haniffa and Cooke, 2005, Kamal and Deegan, 2013).
As well, corporate social activities are considered as a strategic tools as it has the
potential to develop competitive advantage of a firm (Mishra and Suar, 2010) as such the
selected CSD items could be then viewed from strategic management context. As the strategic
management needs to be focused for both long-term and short-term (Hill et al., 2014); therefore,
the selected CSD items could be re-categorised into sub-categories: long-term, short-term and
generic CSDs. That is, the selected 30 items have been categorised within three sub-categories as
attached in Appendix A. These include 19 items for long term, 9 items for short-term and 2 items
for general categories.
Content analysis has been applied to measure corporate social disclosure as it is the most
common method of measuring CSD (Yamagami and Kokubu, 1991). Content analysis is a
method of capturing the text (or content) into code within several categories depending on
selected criteria and widely used in the literature as a reliable method (Weber, 1985; Guthrie and
Petty, 2000 Rashid 2015). Regarding the score calculation, every disclosure item has been given
same significance or weight and this approach is consistent with prior studies (Esa and Anum
Mohd Ghazali, 2012, Haji, 2013, Khan et al., 2013, Mohd Ghazali, 2007, Muttakin and Khan,
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2014, Said et al., 2009). That is, unweighted calculation has been applied in this study as well. In
particular, a firm is awarded a value of 1 if an item included in the checklist is disclosed and a
value of 0 otherwise. However, some disclosure items may not be applicable for every sector that
may distort the score of the corporate social disclosure index. To resolve the potential problem,
consistent with the prior studies, this study also considers maximum possible score to calculate
CSD index (CSDI) (Chau and Gray, 2002, Cooke, 1989, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Lim et al.,
2007, Owusu-Ansah, 1998). For example, irrelevant items for any particular firm (sector) is
considered as “Not Applicable” and CSDI is calculated by considering the proportion of
disclosures made by the firm and maximum possible score for that firm instead that of 30 items.
Such judgement is possible after reading the entire annual reports (Cooke, 1992, Khan et al.,
2013).Therefore, the measurement of voluntary disclosure is based on the following un-weighted
index.
n

CSDIi 

 X ij
i 1

nj

Where,
CSDIj = Corporate Social Disclosure Index of jth firm categories,
Nj = the maximum number of items which the firm is expected to disclosure.
Xij =1 if ith item is disclosed, 0 if ith item is not disclosed

As to the constructed corporate social disclosure index, it is also essential to confirm the
reliability. Internal consistency is a widely used technique for assessing the reliability of a
measurement (Hassan and Marston, 2010, Hassan et al., 2009). Internal consistency means the
degree to which the items in a test measure the same construct. Consistent with prior studies,
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) has been applied to check reliability (Botosan,
1997, Gul and Leung, 2004, Khan et al., 2013).
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3.3 Firm Performance- Dependent Variable
Measuring firm performance in an appropriate manner is significant as various contingent
factors are related to the measurement processes (Orlitzky et al., 2003, Peloza, 2009, Richard et
al., 2009, Wu, 2006). In the literature a large number of indicators have been considered to
measure firm performance. These wide range of indicators are categorised into three categories
such as accounting based measure (i.e.., return on assets, return on sales), market based measure
(i.e., market capitalization, earning per share) and Mix measure (Tobin Q).
Within three types of firm performance measurement approaches, accounting
measurement is used most commonly (Richard et al., 2009). It should however be noted that
manipulation scope of accounting number and selecting a particular method may lead to a
deception (Azim, 2012, Richard et al., 2009) as well as inconsistency in performance
measurements. Market based measurement is preferred as it is forward looking and also
incorporate intangible assets of a firm (Fisher and McGowan, 1983, Lev, 2000). Moreover,
market based measurement may not sometime reflect accurate performance because of market
inefficiency.

(Bacidore et al., 1997, Joh, 2003). Besides, accounting and marked based

performance measurement, a mix method, is also available but not free from

limitations

(Richard et al., 2009).
Although category of firm performance indicator may have some unique features and
limitations; therefore, to overcome such pitfalls, a large number of prior studies put forward the
concept of considering multiple measurement approach (Dalton et al., 1998, Dalton et al., 1999,
Griffin and Mahon, 1997, Orlitzky et al., 2003). Accordingly, this study adopts all three types of
measurements: accounting based, market based and mix measures. Within these three categories,
a large number of prior studies consider either return on assets (Aerts et al., 2008, Eng and Mak,
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2003, Patelli and Prencipe, 2007), or market capitalization (Abdolmohammadi, 2005,
Abdulrahman Anam et al., 2011, Brammer et al., 2006), or Tobin Q (Agrawal and Knoeber,
1996, Rashid et al., 2010, Rashid, 2009) as a representation of accounting, market based and
mixed measurement respectively. Table 2 summarizes all the indicators of firm performance with
the measurement processes,
Table 2: Firm Performance variables with measurement process
Measurement
Category
AccountingBased Measure
Market-Based
Measure
Mixed Measure

Variable

Measurement

Return
on Asset

Net Profit/ Total Asset

Market
Capitaliz
ation

Multiplying total common share outstanding with
the current value of common stock

Tobin Q

(Market Value of the Equity+ Book value of the
debt + Book value of Preferred Stock)
Book value of Assets

3.4 Control Variables
Similar to several extant studies this study considers some unique control variables that
may mediate the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance. The considered
control variables are: (1) firm size (2) leverage of the firm (3) industry type (4) board size and
(5) board independence
Firm size is found to be an important factor for firm performance as larger size of a firm
may have the privilege to achieve several capabilities to enhance a good performance (Majumdar
and Chhibber, 1999, Short and Keasey, 1999). Accordingly, firm size is considered as a control
variable for this study. Consistent with the prior studies, firm size is measured by natural
logarithm of total asset (Cheng et al., 2014, Khan et al., 2013). Social disclosures might vary
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from industry to industry as the context of firm operation is not same. By considering this and
consistent with the prior studies, industry has been considered as control variable and measured
by using Dummy variable (value 1 = firm belongs to financial industry, value 0 = otherwise)
(Alsaeed, 2006, Cooke, 1992). Leverage of a firm might also moderate the firm performance as it
stimulates the cost of debt. Therefore, consistent with the prior studies it is considered as a
control variable and measured as Total Debt/ Equity (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006, Ho and Shun
Wong, 2001). Besides these control variables, from corporate governance characteristics board
size and board independence have been considered as important factors for firm performance
(Dalton et al., 1998, Dalton et al., 1999). Board size is important for firm performance as it
provides the opportunity of gathering a wide range of skills, experience, knowledge and network
provides that may lead to the firm performance. In addition, having independent directors may
also have an impact on the decision making and may contribute to the firm performance.
Therefore, board size and it’s independence have also been considered as moderators of firm
performance. Consistent with prior studies, board size is measured the natural logarithm of total
board members (Carter et al., 2003) and board independence as the proportion of independent
directors within the board (Eng and Mak, 2003, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Khan et al., 2013)
3.5 Regression Models Specification
The basic models are presented as follows.

FPit 1  a  1* CSDI it   2 * FSize it   3 * Levit   4 * Ind it   5 * BSize it   6 * BComit   it ..1
ROAit 1  a  1* CSDI it   2 * FSizeit   3 * Levit   4 * Ind it   5 * BSizeit   6 * BComit   it ..1.1
Mcap it 1  a  1* CSDI it   2 * FSize it   3 * Levit   4 * Ind it   5 * BSizeit   6 * BComit   it ..1.2

TobinQit 1  a  1* CSDI it   2 * FSize it   3 * Levit   4 * Ind it   5 * BSize it   6 * BCom it   it ..1.3
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For conducting statistical analysis, it is important to satisfy the assumptions of statistical
analyses such as normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity (Rashid, 2015a,
Rashid, 2015b). Normality test (Residual Test/Histogram) for the regression equation showed a
“Bell Shape” and confirms the normality of the data. For this study, all the models produce the
bell shape except 1.3 regarding tobin Q. However, Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that the
violation of normality is insignificant with a larger sample (greater than 30). Therefore, having
larger sample (N=402) and bell shape confirms the normality and dismiss the concern.
Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent (or explanatory)
variables and having a high degree of correlation among the explanatory variables lead to a
decisive result. Therefore, these variables must be removed. The correlation matrix of the
explanatory variables (Table 3) shows that there is no strong correlation between the variables
because the correlation coefficients are very small (less than 0.62 or negative). Further, the
variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less than 3.04, while it is argued that a
VIF greater than 10 is an indication of multicollinearity (Dielman, 2001, Gujarati, 2003, Haniffa
and Cooke, 2005). In regards to heteroscedasticity, the plot of standardized residuals (ZRESID)
versus the standardized predicted value (ZPRED) of the model does not look like a funnel or
curve shape representing that there is no proof of heteroscedasticity. However, the chi-square
statistics

and

corresponding

p-value

of

Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey

test

report

that

heteroscedasticity is present. This problem is resolved by using correction technique for
unknown heteroscedasticity of White (1980)
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
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Endogeneity is the relationship between any of the explanatory variables with the error
term. Existence of endogeneity turns the ordinary least square (OLS) estimate as inconsistent,
and instrumental variable techniques are used to address endogeneity. Consistent with the
suggestion of Gujarati (2003) and following prior studies including Rashid (2015a) & Rashid
(2015b) the F-test for the predicted value of CSDI was completely or marginally insignificant.
Considering ROA as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 0.15 and relevant p _ 0.6953),
Market Capitalization as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 3.64 and relevant p _ 0.0634)
and Tobin Q as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 0.23 and relevant p _ 0.6302), the
consistency of OLS and IVs could be confirmed as the finding of these tests indicates that there
are no signs of potential endogeneity between CSDI and the firm performance.
3.6 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistical analyses of the variables are presented in Table 4. This
statistics is employed to determine the distribution and measurement of central tendencies of the
variables and include the mean, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. The
descriptive statistics reveal that the average corporate social disclosure index is 0.16 with a range
from 0 to 0.53. Regarding the firm performance, the average of return on asset, market
capitalization and tobin Q is .047, 22.58 and 1.29 respectively. The range for return on asset,
market-capitalization and Tobin Q is -.096, 19.67 and .05 to .40, 26.91 and 10.54 respectively.
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Results
The regression coefficients of the relationship between corporate social disclosure and
firm performance are presented in Table 5. Based on the regression coefficients CSD positively
influences the firm performance. In particular, the coefficients of Corporate Social Disclosure is
found to be positive and significantly related to ROA (pooled OLS=0.008***, 2SLS=0.000***),
MCAP

(pooled

OLS=0.000***,

2SLS=0.066*)

and

Tobin

Q

(pooled

OLS=0.010***,

2SLS=0.024***). Therefore, the results of pooled OLS and 2SLS suggest that the CSD positively
associated with the firm performance in a significant manner. These findings suggest that CSD
of a firm is likely to be positively affecting the firm performance. These findings could be
considered as a strong support as the data used in this study are panel data, and heterogeneity
issue has been resolved, no endogeneity is observed and two different statistical models (pooled
OLS, 2SLS) have contributed the same results. The results of this study are consistent with
legitimacy and signaling theory. As on the concept of both theories, firms consider CSD as signal
of effective communication to reduce information asymmetry and approach of legitimizing
operational activities (Deegan et al., 2002, Hossain et al., 2015, Morris, 1987, Whiting and
Miller, 2008). Such consideration helps a firm to create a positive impression regarding the firm
activities among the interested parties, which lead to a better firm performance. In other word,
information asymmetry reduces due to CSD and facilitates to develop a good firm value within
the market. Results of this study establish these theoretical arguments. Therefore, the findings of
these results may provide a strong support in favor of considering social issues from firm level
and policymakers may encourage on social issues more efficiently. Similarly, firms may also find
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justification to encourage social issues as a part of regular operation in strategic level as it
stimulates firm performance.
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
4.2 Robustness check
To confirm the robustness of the result, this study conducts two further tests. First, this
study examines the effects of three categories of CSD (long, short, general) on following year
firm performance by replacing overall CSD. Second, an additional endogeneity test has been
applied to check the causality issue.
4.2.1 The effects of the categories of corporate social disclosure on firm performance
To confirm the robustness of the result a further test has been applied by considering each
category of social disclosure (long-term, short-term and generic disclosure) over the firm
performance. In doing so, the following models have been applied.

ROAit 1  a   1* LSDit   2 * SSDit   3 * GSDit   4 * FSize it   6 * Levit   6 * Ind it   7 * BSize it 

 8 * BCom it   it ..(1)

Mcap it 1  a  1* LSDit   2 * SSDit   3 * GSDit   4 * FSize it   6 * Lev it   6 * Ind it   7 * BSize it 

 8 * BCom it   it ..(2)
TobinQit 1  a   1* LSDit   2 * SSDit   3 * GSDit   4 * FSize it   6 * Levit   6 * Ind it   7 * BSize it 
 8 * BCom it   it ..(3)
The regression coefficients of the effects of various categories of CSD on firm
performance are presented in the Table 6. Based on the regression coefficients, strategic/ long
term social disclosure is the key factor for improving firm performance. From every indicator of
firm performance context, it is found that strategic/ long term CSD positively (ROA=0.015*** ;
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Market Capitalization=0.000*** and Tobin Q=0.010*** ) influence firm performance. In contrast,
short-term is not significantly (ROA=0.712; Market Capitalization=0.490; and Tobin Q=0.505)
associated with firm performance. Regarding the effects of generic CSD, firm performance
(ROA and Tobin Q) is not affected (ROA=0.506; and Tobin Q=0.844) except for the market
capitalization (0.002***). This provides evidence that considering social disclosure from the
strategic context is the key to lead the firm performance. Therefore, these findings may provide a
strong support to the policy maker as well as the firm to consider the social issue from the
strategic level with a long-term vision in the context of Bangladesh. Regarding the firm
performance from market capitalization measurement, it is solely reflected the investors
perception while accounting and mixed measure the investors perception is not directly related.
As a result, it could be assumed some investors from Bangladesh might not be well
knowledgeable regarding the social disclosure with exceptions.
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE)
Based on the regression coefficients long-term corporate social disclosure is the key to
influence firm performance as the other types are not significantly associated with firm
performance. This result suggests that considering social issues with a focus from strategic view
helps to stimulate firm performance.
4.2.2 Additional Endogeneity Test
In regards to the relationship between firm performance and corporate social disclosure,
reverse causality problem is a concern as in the literature. It is also documented that firm
performance also have an influence of the corporate social disclosure (Branco and Rodrigues,
2008, Qiu et al., 2016). This study already employed the lag of social disclosure to avoid such
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causality problem. To confirm the reverse causality issue further, a final check of endogeneity by
a simple crossed-lagged regression model has been applied by following (Davidson et al., 1997)
and Rashid (2015a). In so doing, the following six models have been considered:
ROAit 1  a  1* ROAit   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(1)

Mcap it 1  a  1 * Mcap it   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(2)

TobinQit 1  a  1 * TobinQit   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(3)
CSDI it 1  a  1*TobinQit   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(4)
CSDI it 1  a  1 * ROAit   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(5)
CSDI it 1  a  1* Mcap it   2 * CSDI it  Other control Variables   it ..(6)
Within the first three equations, the following year firm performance is considered as a
dependent variable over the current year social disclosure and firm performance. In the following
three equations, next year social disclosure is considered as dependent by considering current
year firm performance and social disclosure as independent variable. Based on the results of first
three equations, it has been supported that the current year firm performance is significantly
associated with the future firm performance. However, based on the result of last three equations,
current year firm performance is not found to be affecting the following year corporate social
disclosure. The result from the above six equations can be concluded that there is no reverse
casualty between firm performance and corporate social disclosure within this research context.

5. Summary and conclusions
This study examines the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance by
considering the year 2011 to 2013 and 2012 to 2014 for CSD and firm performance respectively
within Bangladesh context as a developing country.
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The findings of this study suggest that CSD of a firm has significant positive effect on the
firm performance. These results verify the hypotheses and are also consistent with the theoretical
framework that predicts a positive association between CSD and firm performance. It should also
be noted that the finding is robust for several reasons. First, firm performance from categories of
indicators including return on asset, market capitalization, and tobin Q are significantly related to
the firm performance. This finding is also consistent with prior studies that investigate the
effects of CSD on firm performance (Hossain et al., 2015, Platonova et al., 2016). However, very
limited studies confirm such result by considering every indicator of firm performance. Second,
from the endogeneity test of this study further confirm that it is a strong finding as there is no
endogeneity problem. Finally, this study conducts an additional test to find which category is the
key factor for firm performance and report that long-term social disclosure is the key to
stimulating firm performance. However, this study is not free from limitations. First, this study
limits the social disclosure within 30 items for conducting the content analysis. Future study may
consider interview or case study to gather entity specific information for such revelations.
Second, the sample is limited to the top 134 firms in Bangladesh and the result might not be
applicable for all firms.
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Appendix A
Main
Disclosure

Disclosure
Category

Strategic or
long-term focus

Corporate
Social
Disclosure

Short-term focus

Generic Disclosure

Disclosure Details
1. Existence of l committee for social affairs.
2. Board takes care about social issues as a significant matter.
3. Governance encompasses ethics, transparency and accountability.
4. A commentary on behalf of the board about the key relationship with
employee and other significant stakeholders.
5. Firm policy to promote social welfare.
6. Key person’s (CEO or chairman) views about social issues.
7. CEO statement about considering social issues to the shareholders/
stakeholders.
8. A statement that the firm maintains regular review of social factors.
9. Firm has specific policy for maintaining human rights.
10. Firm has a specific code of conduct to main non-discrimination in
regards to gender, race, religion or ethnic group.
11. Firm activities are affiliated with International Labour Organization.
12. Firm has a specific policy about child labour.
13. Firm has a specific policy about working hour and overtime payment.
14. Firm has specific and clear guideline about employee promotion
15. Firm has faculties about staff training, education, prevention and
control program to manage or avoid work related injuries.
16. Firm has a budget for staff welfare.
17. Amount spent of staff welfare has mentioned.
18. Firm has a clear guideline to handle complained about harassment or
abuse of any employee at any form.
19. Firm has a specific policy regarding security and employment of
workers
20. Community involvement or donation on social issues.
21. Firm has a policy to prioritise greater benefit for the welfare of their
society.
22. Firm has policies and procedure to about anti-corruption.
23. Firm has policy to provide a fair chance to work as a trainee to
various education institute students.
24. Firm has policy to maintain local and national culture and protection
of personal information.
25. Firm has a policy about disadvantage side of the society.
26. Firm has a policy to sponsor regional of national educational, cultural
event.
27. A statement about product safety assurance.
28. A statement about quality assurance in regards to service or product.
29. Any moral statement for considering social issues.
30. Any statement about social welfare for public awareness.
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Table 3 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF)

CSDI
Board Size
Board Independence
Leverage
Sector
Firm Size

CSDI

Board Size

1
0.6233768
-0.0366165
0.3272686
0.3500395
-0.0886693

1
-0.0634219
0.2632631
0.4194249
-0.1117953

Board Independence

1
0.0399622
-0.0451973
0.0520496

Leverage

1
0.6301098
-0.2310624

Sector

Firm Size

1
-0.3927142

VIF

2.401989
2.553555
1.221097
1.029049
2.277089
3.040517

1

Table 4 Descriptive Statistic of the variables (N =402)
ROA

MCAP

TBQ

SDI

Firm Size

Leverage

Sector

Board Size

Board Independence

Mean

0.0473

22.5836

1.2982

0.1691

21.8905

1.2420

0.3657

2.1889

0.1685

Median

0.0258

22.5436

0.9831

0.1333

21.8430

0.4675

0.0000

2.1972

0.1538

Maximum

0.4010

26.9150

10.5491

0.5333

25.6752

78.5667

1.0000

3.2189

0.8000

Minimum

-0.0965

19.6735

0.0512

0.0000

18.0474

0.0059

0.0000

1.0986

0.0000

Std. Dev.

0.0572

1.1969

1.4273

0.1414

1.5291

4.3120

0.4822

0.3782

0.1130

Observations

402

402

402

402

402

402

402

402

402
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Table 5 Regression Analyses regarding the effects of CSD on firm performance.
Return on Asset

Independent
Variables

Pooled OLS
Coefficient

tStatistic

CSDI

0.065

2.640

Firm Size

0.002

1.041

Leverage

-0.000

-1.766

Sector

-0.066

-11.767

Board Size

0.006

.836

Board
Independence

-0.006

-.290

Market Capitalization

2SLS
Prob.
0.008

Coefficient
***

Pooled OLS
tStatistic

0.086

3.378

0.298

-0.000

-.343

0.078*

-0.000

-1.742

0.000

***

Prob.
0.000

Coefficient
***

tStatistic

Tobin Q
2SLS

Prob.

Coefficient

tStatistic

Pooled OLS
Prob.

***

0.696

1.842

0.066

Prob.

Coefficient

tStatistic

1.575

2.581

0.010

1.621

2.262

0.024***

Coefficient
*

2SLS

tStatistic

Prob.

1.615

4.600

0.000

0.731

0.507

14.332

0.000***

0.660

15.418

0.000***

-0.182

-2.595

0.009

-0.190

-2.029

0.043**

0.082*

-0.018

-5.311

0.000***

-0.016

-4.409

0.000***

-0.218

-2.310

***

0.000

***

-0.067

-11.930

0.403

0.010

1.37

0.170

0.146

1.1952

0.771

-0.004

-.218

0.824

-0.344

-1.010

0.021

-0.005

-1.169

0.243

-0.005

-1.220

0.223

*

-1.494

-10.577

0.000

-1.496

-10.742

0.000***

-0.171

-1.733

0.083

0.232

-0.039

-0.303

0.761

0.182

0.929

0.353

0.191

0.940

0.347

0.313

-0.414

-1.157

0.247

0.247

0.442

0.658

0.251

0.451

0.651

R2-

0.270
R2 0.265
R2 0.623
Adjusted R2 0.259
Adjusted R2 0.254
Adjusted R2 0.617
*
Indicate statistically significant at the 10% level
**
Indicate statistically significant at the 5% level
***
Indicate statistically significant at the 1% level
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R2 0.602

R2 0.254

R2 0.254

Adjusted R2 0.595

Adjusted R2 0.242

Adjusted R2 0.242

Table 6 Regression Analyses regarding the effects of CSD categories (strategic/long, short, generic) on firm performance
Independent
Variables

Return on Asset
Coefficient

t-Statistic

Long-term

0.065

2.432

Short-term

0.005

0.368

Generic

0.005

Firm Size

0.002

Market Capitalization
Prob.

Tobin Q

Coefficient

t-Statistic

1.530

3.999

0.712

-0.181

-0.689

0.665

0.506

0.437

3.029

0.002

1.064

0.287

0.501

14.087

0.000

*

-0.020

-4.910

0.000

***

-0.240

-2.521

0.012

0.015

***

Prob.
0.000

0.490
***
***
***

-0.000

-1.733

Sector

-0.066

-11.738

Board Size

0.005

0.759

0.447

0.107

0.861

0.389

Board
Independence

-0.006

-0.320

0.748

-0.407

-1.218

0.223

0.083

R2- 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.257

t-Statistic

1.584

2.561

0.232

0.666

0.505

Prob.

***

Leverage

0.000

Coefficient

***

R2- 0.630
Adjusted R2 0.624

* Indicate statistically significant at the 10% level
** Indicate statistically significant at the 5% level
*** Indicate statistically significant at the 1% level
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0.010

*

0.045

0.196

0.844

-0.178

-2.540

0.011

-0.004

-0.884

-1.470

-10.603

0.377
***
0.000

0.178

0.894

0.371

0.247

0.440

0.659

R2- 0.255
Adjusted R2 0.240
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